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Introduction
Housing markets around the world were affected significantly by the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). Real house prices in New Zealand fell by 15.3% (between 2007Q2 and 2011Q2) , and remained 9.5% below their peak in 2012Q4. In other countries, including Ireland, Spain and the United States, the reduction in house prices was substantially greater (International Monetary Fund, 2012) . Over the same period, new housing construction across New Zealand plummeted, with residential housing consents across the country falling by 56%. After describing a model of regional housing markets in New Zealand, we analyse the multiple channels of influence that the GFC had across subnational housing markets and plot the resulting dynamics caused by the GFC-induced credit shock, focusing on price and construction. The dynamics caused by this shock are compared to those of a migration-induced population shock, which is a more common form of housing shock within New Zealand.
The prima facie importance of both population and credit shocks in driving house prices is illustrated in Figure 1 , using national level data for New Zealand. Population changes (driven primarily by net international migration flows) are highly correlated with house price changes throughout most of the period from 1990 to 2012. However, house prices fell substantially in 2008 following the onset of the GFC (indicated by the dashed line) at a time when population flows would normally suggest flat or modestly growing house prices. The downturn in house prices after the GFC appears long-lasting, with a pronounced double dip in prices following 2007. The GFC resulted in a sharp rise in banks' non-performing loans (NPLs) as a ratio of total bank assets ( Figure 2) ; a standard credit channel operating through banks' balance sheets implies that banks will have restricted credit while the NPL ratio was elevated (Claus and Grimes, 2003) .
This paper contributes to the understanding of the dynamics of housing markets, building on the prior work of Pain & Westaway (1997) , Glaeser & Gyourko (2006) , Glaeser et al (2008) , Grimes & Aitken (2010) and Van Nieuwerburgh & Weill (2010) . Our incorporation of 2 the link between credit markets and the housing market is especially important in light of the recent adoption across a range of countries of macro-prudential policy tools designed, in part, to affect outcomes in the housing market (Lim et al, 2011) . We show that the dynamic responses of housing markets to changes in credit supply are complex and potentially very long-lived. Similar dynamic responses may greatly complicate the conduct of macro-prudential policies designed to affect bank credit allocation.
The model that we use for our simulations, the New Zealand Regional Housing Model (NZRHM), provides a framework to analyse the impacts of key exogenous influences on housing market outcomes. The NZRHM (as in ; henceforth GH) is a revised and updated version of the model in Grimes and Aitken, 2010 (henceforth GA) that modelled housing supply and house prices across New Zealand territorial local authorities (TLAs). The NZRHM models house prices and new housing supply (via new dwelling consents), extending the framework and updating the data used by GA. In addition, the NZRHM models both residential vacant land (lot) prices and average rents. All housing market variables are modelled at the TLA level, across 72 TLAs within New Zealand, using quarterly data from the early to mid 1990s to 2011.
The four modelled variables are co-determined, and are further influenced by a range of exogenous influences. Each of the four modelled relationships has a long term equilibrium component (cointegrating vector) that shows the value to which the modelled variable will tend,
given the values of the exogenous variables (including policy variables) in the system. Values of the exogenous variables differ across TLAs and so each TLA -while driven by the same underlying economic forces -has differing housing market outcomes reflecting its area-specific developments. This use of regionally varying data is important in identifying the responses of the modelled variables to the independent influences.
In addition, the model is estimated with a dynamic (error correction) component that shows how each endogenous variable moves on a quarterly basis, relative to the equilibrium.
Recent changes in other variables may impact the dynamic adjustment path, potentially causing some initial movements away from equilibrium. Price expectations, for instance, may cause housing market adjustments that lead to temporary deviations in outcomes away from equilibrium, and we explore this factor in our simulations.
The simulated dynamics are the result of shocks to the model using the (former) Manukau TLA as our focus. Importantly, however, the dynamics would be very similar when applied to other TLAs. The first shock is an exogenous shock to population, simulated as an immigration surge into the TLA of a magnitude reflecting the observed "abnormal" population increase in the Manukau TLA between the 2001 and 2006 censuses. The abnormal increase is taken to be the actual percentage increase in the Manukau population over that period (expressed quarterly) in excess of the average quarterly rate of population growth across New Zealand over a prolonged period. This shock causes housing demand (and hence house prices) to jump, which in turn induces an increase in housing supply. However, the population shock also reduces land availability per person, and as such land prices increase. This increases the replacement cost of housing and results in a permanently higher number of people per dwelling. Our analysis suggests it takes nine years for the housing supply to equilibrate following the exogenous increase in demand, where the dynamics of adjustment primarily reflect supply rigidities. An additional dynamic impact arises from the modelled (extrapolative) expectations process which magnifies the price dynamics caused by the supply rigidities.
The effect of a migration flow on local housing markets is thereafter used as a yardstick for the second shock that we consider; a cut to credit supply, driven by an exogenous and prolonged increase in the NPL ratio of New Zealand registered banks. This proxy is chosen as it is a pre-determined variable that is likely to cause banks to change their lending criteria. The NPL ratio is not driven by changes to credit demand so can be considered an exogenous indicator of credit restrictions emanating from the supply side of the finance sector. Unlike the population shock, our data do not enable us to observe regional variations in the credit cycle.
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Thus our simulations of the impact of a change in the NPL ratio should be interpreted as the housing market impacts that arise from an increase in the NPL ratio plus any other factors correlated with that increase (e.g. a generalised increase in risk aversion in the economy) that are omitted from our model.
Tighter credit restrictions have two effects in the model. First, they reduce some borrowers' access to credit, which reduces the amount that will be bid for a house, placing downward pressure on house prices. Second, they reduce developers' access to credit, which is required to construct new houses, thereby reducing the housing supply response to a given set of price signals. This latter effect temporarily reduces housing supply, resulting in upward pressure on house prices. Thus credit restrictions place opposite pressures on house prices. Our model enables us to consider both influences separately or together, thereby disentangling the complex dynamics that a credit shock has on housing markets.
The simulated credit shock mirrors the jump (and subsequent decline) in New Zealand banks' NPL ratio after the GFC. The countervailing effects of the shock on housing demand and housing supply result in complex dynamics as a result of the shock to credit supply. The demand effect, which dominates, causes house prices to fall substantially almost immediately after the shock. The subsequent shortage of supply that this creates (due to reduced incentives for construction whilst other variables remain at baseline levels) causes prices to bounce back so that house prices exceed their baseline level after four years. Eventually, the price rise (relative to baseline) mirrors the initial degree of price decline. The cycle in house prices is damped but the effects of the shock on house price dynamics are still apparent fifteen years after the shock's onset.
One over-arching conclusion across the two simulations is that housing markets are slow to adjust to shocks causing disequilibria, so that exogenous shocks have very long lasting effects.
Specifically, we find that an increase in population leads to a prolonged period of upward pressure on prices (houses, land and rents). Full adjustment takes nine years for the modelled population shock. Similarly, tighter credit restrictions following a GFC-sized shock lead to a very prolonged and highly cyclical adjustment in house construction and prices, reflecting both the demand and supply effects emanating from the credit market.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly outlines the key equations within NZRHM. Section 3 describes the impacts of the population shock and teases out the roles of supply rigidities and the expectations setting process in affecting dynamic adjustment.
Section 4 outlines the impacts of the credit supply shock, disentangling the supply-side versus the demand-side impacts of the increased credit restrictions. Section 5 compares the simulation results and discusses what they may imply for actual housing markets and policies.
The Model
The New Zealand Regional Housing Model (NZHRM) comprises four key relationships explaining: house prices, house construction (and hence dwelling stock), residential land (lot) prices, and rents. The model is estimated across all 72 TLAs in mainland New Zealand (keeping the newly amalgamated Auckland TLAs as separate authorities, and incorporating the former Banks Peninsula TLA as part of Christchurch City). All modelling uses quarterly data extending from the early to mid 1990s to 2011Q2. The existence of a long run equilibrium (cointegrating) equation is implied by a stationary estimated long run residual. We use the Im-Pesaran-Shin (IPS) and Levin-Lin-Chu (LLC) panel unit root tests to test for stationarity (versus the null hypothesis of a unit root) of the residual from the long run equation. The LLC test assumes that the same time series processes operate across TLAs whereas the IPS does not make this restriction. For this reason, the IPS is our preferred test. We note however, that neither the IPS nor the LLC test is strictly appropriate to test the stationarity of a residual obtained using estimated parameters. We therefore supplement these tests with the requirement that the residual from the cointegrating regression be strongly significant (p<0.01) in the error correction equation. 2 The results of such an approach supports the existence of a long-run relationship for each endogenous variable. and by bank credit restrictions. Such restrictions may conceivably take a variety of forms including a higher home equity requirement (lower loan to value ratio), tighter covenants on debt servicing ratios, or stricter criteria on borrower eligibility (Claus and Grimes, 2003) . Rather than modelling each of these directly (given the lack of data on each), we include the banking system's proportion of loans that are non-performing (impaired loans plus those at least 90 days overdue).
This variable is predetermined at any given time; a higher ratio is likely to cause banks to adopt stricter loan criteria during the period that the banks are working to reduce their NPL ratio. Thus we take the banks' NPL ratio as our underlying variable that proxies the restrictiveness of banks' credit rationing policies. 9 In addition to the long run determinants, changes in (real) rents impact positively on house prices in the short run.
The housing supply equation is based on the theoretical outline in GA, with key elements also reproduced in the Appendix. In accordance with a Tobin's Q approach to investment, additions to the dwelling stock occur when it is profitable for builders/developers to build new dwellings. Thus new construction responds positively to increased house prices, but is affected negatively by rises in residential lot prices and/or construction costs. New construction may be restricted by tighter credit conditions which reduce the ability of builders/developers to access the finance required to purchase land, materials and labour for housing construction even when Tobin's Q is greater than unity. In the short run, housing construction also responds positively to expectations of rising housing market prices. The dynamics of adjustment incorporate nonlinear and asymmetric adjustment coefficients with especially strong adjustment as the Q ratio rises well above unity.
8 Consistent with GA, all price expectations variables in the model are based on extrapolation of the past three years' rate of price growth in a TLA (or nationally for national variables). 9 We do not have similar information on non-performing loans of other parts of the financial system, although finance company loan impairments could be particularly important for the availability of credit to developers. The NPL variable will be correlated with non-performing loans from other financial intermediaries, so will pick up some of these effects, albeit imperfectly.
Lot prices are set as a result of a bargaining game between landowners (farmers) and developers who act as intermediaries for the ultimate homebuyer. Suppose a farmer owns lotsized farm land, which is valued at the farmland price. The developer can prepare the land for residential use through incurring development costs (a function of construction costs) and paying a development contribution to the council (levied under the Local Government Act, and/or a financial contribution levied under the Resource Management Act) 10, 11 . The minimum lot price that allows for non-negative profits for converting farmland to residential land is, therefore, the land's value as farmland plus the sum of development costs and development contributions.
In a TLA with perfectly elastic supply of farmland and all development occurring at the periphery of an urban area, this expression will determine the residential lot price, . However, some residential lot development may occur through subdivision within an urban area, especially where planning controls or geographical constraints inhibit expansion at the urban periphery (Grimes and Liang, 2009; Saiz, 2010) . As house prices tend to their replacement cost in the long run, new lots cannot be sold to a developer for more than the level of house prices less construction costs for a new house. The lot price will be higher the closer the lot is located to the city centre (or other sought-after amenity); and, for any chosen lot, this convenience yield will be higher the greater is the pressure on population in the area. We therefore hypothesise that the average urban lot price may rise above the minimum lot price according to: (a) the level of house prices less construction costs for a new house, and (b) the impact of population pressures on land for new housing development in the presence of residential land constraints (Grimes and Liang, 2009 ). In the absence of explicit regulatory measures, we hypothesise that the current population level relative to that in 1991 (when current TLA boundaries were set) provides an indicator of relative land constraints. Consistent with this bargaining game approach, our 10 Our data for this variable only starts with the start of the development contribution regime in 2002Q3. Dummy variables are included in the equations to account for this data discontinuity. 11 See Palmon and Smith (1998) for a discussion of the ways that development contributions can affect property prices.
11 estimated long run equation finds that the real residential lot price is set as a function of real farm prices, real development plus financial contributions per housing consent, real house prices and the interaction of house prices with population growth relative to the 1991 population level (which has an additional positive short run effect).
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As in Grimes and Aitken (2007) , rents are set so as to provide landlords with a market yield, given the level of house prices. The total real yield to landlords equals the rental yield plus expected real capital gains on the house; thus (in accordance with our long run estimates) rental yields fall as expected capital gains rise while rents rise in response to increases in both house prices and interest rates. Rents (relative to house prices) are also estimated to rise, in the short term, as the rate of government rental assistance (accommodation supplement) rises; we find no evidence of a long run effect of this variable on rents, consistent with a market in which there is a high supply elasticity of new landlords (Coleman and Scobie, 2009 ).
Population (Migration) Shock
We subject the NZRHM, as characterised in Tables 2 and 3 , to two separate shocks.
These shocks are conducted over a fifteen year window for a single TLA, Manukau, which is a major area of housing growth in the south of Auckland, but the shocks could equally be applied to any other TLA. The simulated shock outcomes are compared to a baseline without the shock. 
Population Shock (Including Extrapolative Expectations)
As a result of the 20 quarter (net) migration surge, the population level in the simulation is permanently above baseline from the start of period 0 onwards. From quarter 20 onwards population is 11.2% above baseline. The increase in population, in the presence of adjustment 14 Rounding causes the difference to be 0.54% per quarter rather than 0.53%.
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costs that prevent the rate of new housing investment from keeping pace with the migration surge, places upward pressure on house prices as the ratio of population to the housing stock rises. The sustained increase in house prices becomes embedded in expectations of further capital gains in housing which contributes to a reduction in the (perceived) user cost of capital.
The reduction in the user cost of capital temporarily exacerbates the increase in house prices.
Consequently, house prices exceed the baseline case by a maximum of 23.6% in the 22 nd quarter.
Importantly, the population increase also places upward pressure on residential lot prices (through the interaction term between population and house prices).
The increase in house prices drives Tobin's Q above unity (since building costs are assumed not to rise, and lot prices do not increase sufficiently to cause the total development cost increase to outweigh the house price increase). The increase in the Q ratio causes housing investment to increase, with the path of the housing investment rate broadly mirroring the path of house prices. The peak expansion in housing investment coincides with that of house prices;
housing investment rate is 0.6 percentage points above baseline 22 quarters after the initial shock.
The increased housing investment causes the housing stock to increase gradually throughout the first nine years of the simulation. The fact that the stock is increasing materially for a further four years beyond the end of the migration surge indicates the lags involved in meeting the residential needs of an abnormal increase in the population. When construction exceeds the increases in population we find house prices start returning towards baseline. House prices are approximately equivalent to their baseline level after ten years. However, the reduction in house price deviations from baseline after the fifth year sets in train a slight downward overshoot of house prices; this effect is again exacerbated through the (negative) expected capital gains channel.
The equilibrium condition in the supply equation suggests that long run house prices increase by 22% of the long run increase in lot prices (holding construction costs constant),
where the latter rises due to the added population pressure. The resulting increase in long run real house prices causes a reduction in demand for housing (relative to the population), so the final increase in the housing stock is less than the increase in population. After fifteen years, the housing stock in the model has increased by 9.2% compared with the 11.2% increase in population. Thus there is a permanent increase in the number of people per dwelling following the migration surge as a result of pressure on residential land prices.
One key finding of the simulation, other than the directions and magnitudes of effects, is that a five year migration surge (of a scale recently witnessed in New Zealand) causes a ten year house price cycle, with slight cyclical echoes stretching beyond ten years. Thus a population shock has a long term impact on the housing market (and broader economy) over the course of an extended cycle.
Population Shock (Excluding Extrapolative Expectations)
The previous simulation uses the full estimated model to simulate the dynamics associated with a (net) migration inflow. Part of the dynamic adjustment is due to the incorporation of extrapolative expectations in the model. In order to understand the role attributed to expectations, we decompose the dynamics into variation attributed to our specification of expectations and all other factors (dominated by the rigidities in the adjustment of the housing stock). Specifically, Figure 4 depicts the impact of the same net migration inflow if expectations were formed independent of the shock, i.e. where the growth in house and land prices is expected to be that under the baseline. Such expectations are consistent with a situation where agents (erroneously) believe that house prices follow a random walk with drift, in which case an agent's best prediction of tomorrow's house price is today's house price plus a constant growth rate.
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The lower right panel of Figure 3 , when compared to that of Figure 4 , indicates a degree of self-fulfilment in expectations of house price growth; house prices increase further if future growth rates in prices are anticipated to be similar to those currently than would be the case without extrapolative expectations. Without the expectations channel, house prices exceed baseline levels by a maximum of 18% in the 22 nd quarter compared with the maximum 24% over baseline under the alternative scenario. Importantly, without extrapolative expectations, the convergence towards the new long run house price level is characterised by less cyclicality and volatility. House prices in this scenario do not fall below baseline levels, rather the difference decays monotonically from the maximum to remain 6.7% above baseline at the end of our simulation period.
The reduced spike in house prices results in a reduced incentive for developers to construct new homes in the early stages of the simulation period, but also results in a reduced incentive to cut back on construction as house prices fall from their peak. The result is that the quarterly housing investment rate exceeds baseline by 0.44 percentage points in the 22 nd quarter, thereafter fluctuating around 0.05 percentage points above baseline. Given that house prices are still above the baseline level at the end of the simulation window, housing investment remains above baseline fifteen years after the onset of the shock.. The peak in the housing investment rate is 0.16 percentage points below the maximum under the scenario incorporating extrapolative expectations. Hence, without the extrapolative expectations channel, the housing stock level is slower to equilibrate following the change in population and is still increasing in response to the shock at the fifteen year mark. After fifteen years, the housing stock in the scenario without extrapolative expectations is 0.9 percentage points lower than in the simulation with expectations incorporated.
Collectively, the two previous simulations suggest the extent to which expectations on both the demand and supply sides affect the housing market. A scenario which allows for expectations to be extrapolative on the demand side, while conforming to baseline growth expectations on the supply side, differs little from the outcomes in subsection 3.1. This situation might arise if developers act only in response to observed, rather than expected, disequilibria whereas buyers have extrapolative expectations. On the demand side of our model, price expectations flow through to long run housing demand (and hence to house prices) via the user cost of capital, with additional short run effects through the setting of rents. These channels, especially through the user cost of capital, therefore appear to be the dominant form of transmission of extrapolative expectations to housing outcomes. 
Credit Restrictions Shock
The second shock that we simulate is a cut to credit supply, driven by a prolonged exogenous increase in banks' NPL ratio. The increase mirrors the jump (and subsequent decline)
in the NPL ratio of New Zealand banks' after the GFC. We simulate the impacts of the tighter credit restrictions initially with the demand side channel operating only, then just with the supply side channel operating, and finally with both channels operative. This enables us to decompose the full effects of the credit channel on the housing market into its two competing sources.
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In each case, the same shock is considered. The average NPL ratio over the period Figure 5 shows the impacts of the shock to the NPL ratio on the housing market where we activate only the housing demand (house price) channel. Thus, in the housing supply equation, we hold the NPL ratio at its baseline path while we use the simulated path of NPLs in the house price equation; housing supply still reacts to house prices and therefore reacts indirectly to the NPL shock.
Credit Restrictions (Housing Demand Channel Only)
The reduction in credit supplied to prospective house purchasers constrains bids on the margin and leads to a significant fall in the house price level (relative to baseline), with a peak fall of 7.7% eight quarters after the start of the shock. This fall compares with an actual peak to trough fall in national (New Zealand) real house prices after the onset of the GFC of 15.3%, implying that credit restrictions accounted for approximately half of the fall in real house prices.
(Other factors, such as falls in real incomes, are held constant in our simulation.) The fall in house prices reduces the profitability associated with new housing construction. As a result, housing investment is below the baseline level for 18 quarters following the start of the shock whilst the housing stock is below baseline for almost 8 years, with a peak fall relative to baseline of approximately 1%.
The erosion of the per capita housing stock via reduced investment, however, places upward pressure on house prices. Thus house prices gradually return to baseline and then overshoot baseline by almost 8% seven years after the onset of the shock. This price increase reverses the housing investment shortfall, with investment exceeding baseline from quarters 19 to 43, thereafter remaining just below baseline through to the end of our fifteen year simulation.
The higher investment rate, caused by the house price overshoot, leaves the housing stock slightly above (but returning to) baseline from quarters 33 onwards.
The nature of the cycle in house prices and new construction mirrors the shape of the actual cycle witnessed since the GFC. House prices initially fell in the post-GFC period and new housing construction collapsed. Subsequently, house prices have increased sharply (particularly in the country's largest city, Auckland, 16 where housing construction has fallen well behind population growth) and new construction activity is underway. Figure 6 shows the impacts of the shock to the NPL ratio on the housing market when we activate only the housing supply (new housing consents) channel. In the house price equation, we hold the NPL ratio at its baseline path while we use the simulated path of NPLs in the housing investment equation; house prices react to changes in supply and so react indirectly to the NPL shock.
Credit Restrictions (Housing Supply Channel Only)
The credit restrictions reduce new housing investment as developers face reduced access to credit. As a result, housing investment remains below baseline for almost three years and the housing stock is below baseline for approximately five years. The result of the supply shortfall (with other factors held constant) is an increase in house prices consequent on the credit shock.
However the peak house price increase is just 0.7%, with the small size of the increase mirroring the subdued nature of the housing supply responses. Overall, while the impact on house prices through the housing supply channel is in the opposite direction to that through the demand-side channel, the supply-side effect is the smaller of the two.
Credit Restrictions (Both Channels)
With both channels operating, the dynamics in house prices are similar to those from just the demand channel (Figure 7 ). House prices fall below baseline by a maximum of 7.5% in the 8 th quarter, before rising to a peak of 7.2% above baseline after 26 quarters. The housing supply response is magnified relative to the demand case since both the supply and demand channels cause an initial reduction in new housing investment. Investment is below baseline for four years after the onset of the shock while the housing stock remains below baseline for seven years, with a maximum reduction of 1.2% relative to baseline. As the per capita stock falls (given exogenous population growth) prices increase thereby inducing new supply. Housing investment consequently rises above baseline for a period of six years before tracking just below its baseline level.
In contrast to the dynamics of the NPL ratio, which is characterised by a rapid rise to a peak ratio followed by a continuous decline until the ratio returns to baseline, the housing market displays marked cyclical behaviour. As expected, the credit shock causes a reduction in house prices and construction activity, but it also sets in train the prerequisites for a housing boom, even while the NPL ratio is still above its baseline level. Thus house prices and new house 20 construction both peak approximately six years after the onset of the credit shock at which time the NPL ratio is still 0.24 percentage points above its baseline level. The complex dynamics of the housing market -in which the housing dynamics differ materially from the dynamics of the underlying shock -are therefore illustrated clearly through this simulation.
Conclusions
The New Zealand Regional Housing Model (NZRHM) provides a framework to analyse the impacts of key policy and exogenous influences on housing market outcomes. It models four key variables within local housing markets: house prices, housing supply (new dwelling consents), residential vacant land (lot) prices, and average rents. The four modelled variables interact with each other in a system of long run (equilibrium) and short run (dynamic) equations.
We use the model to simulate the effects on TLA housing markets of two separate exogenous shocks. The first is a permanent population shock (temporary migration surge) which mirrors the actual "abnormal" increase in population experienced by Manukau between 2001 and 2006. The shock increases house prices, as new supply falls short of the increased population.
The higher prices in turn induce new housing investment, resulting in a higher path for the housing stock. However, the rise in the housing stock falls short of the rise in population owing to a permanent increase in land prices caused by population pressures; the housing stock rises by 9.2% after fifteen years, compared with the 11.2% increase in population. Furthermore, there is a major cycle of nine to ten years (i.e. starting at baseline, rising to a peak in house construction and house prices, and then back to baseline), with indications of a small cyclical effect thereafter.
Approximately three-quarters of the amplitude of the cycle is explained by price reactions in the face of supply rigidities; the remainder is due to the effects of extrapolative price expectations magnifying the price responses following past changes in observed house prices.
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The second shock is a prolonged increase in the restrictiveness of credit provided by the financial system. The source of the credit shock is an exogenous increase in banks' nonperforming loans which causes them to increase the stringency of their lending criteria. The size of the shock mirrors the actual rise in NPLs experienced by New Zealand banks after the GFC.
The shock has a direct negative effect on housing supply (as developers find it more difficult to access credit for new developments), while also having a direct negative effect on house prices as prospective purchasers curtail their bids for houses. The house price reduction induces a further decrease in new housing investment. The result of the two influences is that the housing market exhibits marked dynamics in which prices and construction initially fall below baseline and then rise to a peak above baseline of a similar magnitude to the initial trough. This cycle continues in a damped fashion even beyond the end of our fifteen year simulation period.
In absolute terms, the (actual) population shock has a greater impact on construction outcomes relative to baseline than the (actual) credit shock. Housing investment rises to a peak above baseline of approximately 0.6 percentage points for the population shock whereas the peak rise is 0.16 percentage points for the credit shock. Similarly, the peak house price rise relative to baseline with the population shock is 24% whereas the peak change following the credit shock is 7.5%. However the trough to peak changes under the credit shock are closer to the population shock, with a trough to peak rise in housing investment of approximately 0.3 percentage points and a trough to peak rise in house prices of approximately 15%.
One overarching conclusion from these simulations is that shocks cause long-lived dynamics within the housing market. Whilst extrapolative expectations of future house price growth increase the amplitude of the housing cycles, the key reason for the prolonged dynamics is the time that it takes to achieve a material change in the dwelling stock through new 
Appendix: Derivation of Long Run Demand and Supply Equations
Long run housing demand equation
GA consider an economy with identical individuals at time , each of whom derives utility from real non-housing consumption ( ) and housing services ( ) where is the individual's housing stock and is the ratio of the individual's housing services to housing stock. 17 In each period, the individual earns ; the individual's real wealth, , can be allocated between and real financial assets ( ). The prices of the housing stock and non-housing consumption are and respectively; their ratio is denoted , and is the expected rate of change of between and . The real after-tax return on is ; the real return on equals the real rate of capital gain ( ) less the rate of depreciation ( ) and less the foregone rate of earnings (or the after-tax cost of borrowing), , on the real housing capital ( ). Thus the intertemporal constraint for the state variable, , is given by (1):
In each period, the individual has a constant relative risk aversion utility function that is separable in non-housing consumption and housing services; thus the individual's value function in (with being the discount factor) is given by:
Taking the ratio of the first order conditions for (2) with respect to and respectively, yields the optimum ratio of housing stock to consumption for the individual:
where: is the real user cost of capital for housing.
Aggregating (3) over all individuals and solving for , we obtain:
Expressing as , adding regional subscripts to relevant variables, and taking logs yields expression (5) for the equilibrium house price:
-
where: is total non-housing consumption in at . Equation (5) forms the basis for the long run house price equation in Table 2 where is replaced by (multiplied by a coefficient), per capita consumption is proxied by TLAspecific time trends, and credit restriction and accommodation supplement terms are added as additional variables impacting respectively on per capita consumption and on the effective user cost of capital.
Long run housing supply equation
We assume that a builder seeks to build a new house where the house sale price exceeds the full cost of developing and building a new house. Total costs are a function of building costs and residential lot (vacant land) costs plus builders' financing costs. We further assume that some substitutability exists between land and structures for a given level of utility for the ultimate purchaser, but that both sets of inputs are required for any development to proceed. Accordingly, we adopt a divisia index for total costs in TLA at time as a function of residential land costs and (national) building costs with weights summing to one. In addition, real financing costs ( ) must be borne by the developer. Thus, we postulate:
where incorporates TLA-specific cost factors and reflects the holding period between the builder raising finance and selling the house. In equilibrium, house prices equal total costs so that . Using this equilibrium condition, and rearranging (6), we obtain the long run relationship:
where incorporates the finance cost term and any other national factors affecting the equilibrium relationship. If (7) forms a cointegrating vector then it is valid to model housing consents relative to the housing stock (a stationary variable) as a function of the (stationary)
residual from equation (7). Series with an i subscript have TLA-specific data; non-subscripted variables are national.
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Tables and Figures
A supercript G added to a price variable denotes an expectations measure for the rate of change in the variable where the rate of (extrapolative) expectation is based on data for the 3 years up to the the last quarter. is the lagged residual from the corresponding long run equation.
No area fixed effects, time fixed effects or area specific time trends are included in the short run specifications. 
